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The issue of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) has remained a festering wound in India’s post-independence history. While much has been written and debated about the origins of this territorial dispute, one cannot overlook the role of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in shaping its current form. The decision to internationalize the issue by taking it to the United Nations in 1948, at a time when the Indian Army was in a strong position, is widely seen by critics and even military veterans as a grave strategic mistake. This act not only halted India’s military momentum but permanently ceded large portions of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan, now referred to as PoK.

Background: The Tribal Invasion of 1947

In October 1947, soon after India gained independence, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir found itself at the center of a violent crisis. The state, ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, had not yet acceded to either India or Pakistan. Taking advantage of this vacuum, Pakistan launched a covert invasion using tribal militias supported by its army. The raiders committed horrific atrocities in the region, particularly in areas like Baramulla.

Faced with an existential threat, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession to India on 26 October 1947. The very next day, Indian troops were airlifted into Srinagar. The Indian Army, under the leadership of commanders like Lt. Gen. Cariappa, began repelling the invaders and regaining territory.

The Manekshaw Episode: Nehru’s Hesitation and Patel’s Resolve

One of the most telling incidents from this period was revealed by Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw in a later interview. At the time, Manekshaw was a young Colonel and part of the military staff present during key decision-making moments.

Manekshaw recalled:

“As usual, Nehru was talking about the United Nations, Russia, and diplomacy, and all that. Sardar Patel got up and said, ‘Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir or do you want to give it away?’ He turned to me and said, ‘You have got your orders.’ That is how we moved in with aircraft and saved Kashmir.”

This brief yet powerful exchange highlights the difference in approaches between Nehru and Sardar Patel. While Nehru leaned heavily on diplomacy and the UN, Patel was clear-headed, pragmatic, and firm on national security. Unfortunately, Patel’s influence on Kashmir policy was limited, as Nehru had taken it upon himself to handle the issue.

Military Gains Were Being Made

Once the Indian Army landed in Srinagar, it managed to stabilize the region. The tide began turning in India’s favor. Indian forces recaptured significant territory, and the Pakistani-backed tribal invaders were retreating. Military historians widely agree that if the Indian Army had continued its operations for a few more weeks, the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir could have been under Indian control.

However, in a controversial move, Nehru decided to halt the military campaign and approached the United Nations on January 1, 1948, seeking international mediation. The reasoning, as stated by Nehru and his supporters, was to avoid a prolonged conflict and earn moral high ground in the eyes of the world. But this decision effectively froze the status quo, allowing Pakistan to retain control over the territory it had occupied.

The UN Resolution and Its Aftermath

The United Nations responded by passing a resolution on 13 August 1948 that called for a ceasefire, followed by the withdrawal of Pakistani troops and disarmament of tribal militias, after which India was to reduce its military presence. Only then could a plebiscite be conducted to determine the will of the people.

Pakistan never withdrew its troops, thus violating the primary condition for a plebiscite. India, on the other hand, had already halted its military operations and accepted the ceasefire. The result was a de facto partition of Jammu and Kashmir, with one-third of the region going into Pakistan’s control — which came to be known as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Strategic and Diplomatic Blunders

Nehru’s decision to approach the UN is viewed by many as a classic case of idealism overtaking realism. He underestimated Pakistan’s intentions and overestimated the neutrality of global powers. While Nehru was envisioning global peace and moral victories at international forums, Pakistan was rapidly consolidating its control over the captured territories.

Moreover, taking the matter to the UN internationalized a bilateral issue that could have been resolved by force, especially when the military situation favored India. It handed Pakistan a permanent handle to interfere in Kashmir and invited foreign powers into a matter of Indian sovereignty.

Patel Was Kept Out

It is also worth noting that Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, India’s first Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister, was deliberately kept out of Kashmir affairs. Patel had successfully integrated over 560 princely states into the Indian Union using a combination of diplomacy and firmness. His exclusion from the Kashmir matter is widely seen as a strategic loss for India. Had Patel been given a free hand, many believe the outcome would have been entirely different.

The Legacy of PoK

Today, PoK remains a major security concern. It is not just a moral or territorial loss but also a base for anti-India activities. The region has been used for launching terror attacks against India and has strategic importance due to its proximity to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Generations of Indians have lived with the consequences of that fateful decision in 1948. The scars of Nehru’s diplomacy-first approach are still visible on the map of India, and the unfinished task of reclaiming PoK remains an emotive issue in Indian politics and society.

Conclusion

History is often shaped by critical decisions made in moments of crisis. Nehru’s move to take the Kashmir issue to the United Nations, driven by idealistic hopes and a lack of military foresight, permanently altered the territorial integrity of India. Field Marshal Manekshaw’s recollection and Patel’s assertive leadership reveal a moment when strong action could have changed the future — but was lost to hesitation and overreliance on diplomacy.

Pakistan-occupied Kashmir was not created by Pakistan alone; it was enabled by India’s own internal miscalculations. And at the center of that misstep was Nehru’s fateful decision to stop a winnable war and look outward for solutions to an internal problem.

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