Why Sonia Gandhi Didn’t Allow Strikes After 26/11?

The Real Cost of Congress Inaction After 26/11: A Misguided Fear That Insulted Indian Muslims and Emboldened Pakistan

The 26/11 Mumbai attacks of 2008 were more than just a terrorist strike—they were an open declaration of war. Ten Pakistani terrorists, directed by handlers in Pakistan and trained by Lashkar-e-Taiba with the backing of the Pakistani intelligence agency ISI, crossed into India by sea and waged a three-day siege, murdering over 160 people, injuring hundreds, and paralyzing India’s financial capital. The world watched in horror, and Indians looked to their leaders for a fitting, resolute response.

Instead, the Congress-led UPA government, under Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and de facto head Sonia Gandhi, chose silence and strategic inaction. It was a moment that demanded clarity and courage, yet was met with hesitation, miscalculations, and political fears—especially the misguided notion that any retaliation against Pakistan could trigger communal unrest in India and jeopardize Congress’s Muslim vote base in the upcoming 2009 general election.

Sonia Gandhi’s Calculated Restraint and Its Flawed Logic

While Dr. Singh was the Prime Minister in title, it was no secret that Sonia Gandhi called the shots in the UPA. On issues of national importance, from economic reforms to foreign policy, key decisions often came from 10 Janpath, not the PMO. The decision not to strike back after 26/11 followed the same pattern. Despite mounting public anger and overwhelming intelligence pointing to Pakistani complicity, Congress chose “restraint.”

Sources from that time and subsequent political analysis reveal that this restraint was less about international diplomacy and more about domestic vote-bank politics. The Congress leadership feared that a military response might inflame Hindu-Muslim tensions and alienate Muslim voters—especially in sensitive states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

This reasoning was not only flawed—it was insulting to India’s Muslim population. It assumed, without evidence, that Indian Muslims sympathize with Pakistan or that they would react adversely to an attack on a foreign enemy state responsible for the murder of Indian citizens. It is a stereotype long propagated by pseudo-secular politics, one that collapses under historical scrutiny.

Indian Muslims Have Always Stood With India

India has fought four major wars with Pakistan—1947, 1965, 1971, and Kargil in 1999. In none of these wars did India witness mass communal violence as a result. Indian Muslims stood with the nation, joined the armed forces, and contributed to the war effort like every other citizen.

In fact, the 1971 war, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, was a high point of Indian unity. Indian Muslims did not see Pakistan as their “natural home.” They saw themselves—correctly—as Indians, a sentiment that has only grown stronger over the decades.

Congress Under Sonia Chickened Out

Former Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief Fali Homi Major—who was the Air Chief Marshal during the 26/11 Mumbai attacks—publicly stated in later interviews and writings that the Indian Air Force was fully prepared for retaliatory strikes, but the UPA government chose not to act.

In his memoir “India’s Most Fearless 3” and various public forums, he emphasized:

“We were ready to respond. We had the capability. But the political leadership didn’t have the will.”

He specifically mentioned that strike options were presented to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), but the civilian leadership led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and dominated by Sonia Gandhi’s political influence did not approve any action. This refusal to act demoralized the armed forces and sent a dangerous signal to Pakistan: that India, even after such a heinous civilian massacre, lacked the political will to retaliate. Far from de-escalating future threats, this emboldened Pakistan’s military establishment and its jihadi proxies. It gave them the confidence to plan more attacks .

This was despite the fact that:

  • The Air Force had identified multiple terror camps across the border.
  • Plans were drawn for precise airstrikes with minimal civilian damage.
  • The retaliation could have been swift and surgical.

Fali Major’s testimony debunks the Congress claim that retaliation was not feasible. It confirms that the military was ready, but politicians chickened out—largely due to misplaced fears of communal fallout and international opinion, neither of which stood true when similar actions were taken by the Modi government post-Uri and Pulwama and Operation Sindoor done in may 2025 which hit Pakistan’s terror camps in pok and pakistan’s punjab.

The Real Cost of Inaction: Security, Morale, and Dignity

The decision to do nothing came at a steep cost—not electorally (since Congress did win the 2009 elections), but strategically and morally.

  1. Loss of Deterrence: Pakistan learned that India, under Congress rule, would tolerate even the most brutal provocations without consequence. This shattered any remaining deterrence and made future attacks more likely.
  2. Demoralization of Forces: The armed forces and intelligence agencies, who work tirelessly to protect the country, felt betrayed. Years of intelligence gathering and military preparedness were shelved due to political cowardice.
  3. Public Cynicism: Citizens lost faith in the government’s will to protect them. For the families of the victims, justice remained elusive. India appeared as a soft state unwilling to defend its honor.
  4. Empowering the Terror Ecosystem: By failing to dismantle terror infrastructure in PoK after 26/11, India allowed those networks to evolve. The same elements were involved in future attacks. India paid in blood—again.

Contrast With Later Leadership

After the 2016 Uri attack, the Indian Army carried out surgical strikes across the LoC, destroying terror launchpads. After Pulwama in 2019, the Indian Air Force carried out airstrikes deep into Balakot. Both operations were executed successfully, without triggering any communal unrest. On May 7th India carried out operation sindoor.

This exposed the Congress narrative as a myth. Indian Muslims did not riot. Hindu extremists did not take to the streets. Instead, the entire nation—across religious lines—stood behind the armed forces. It proved what Indians already knew: our unity is stronger than the Congress party’s political fears.

Conclusion: A Leadership That Misjudged Its People

The decision not to retaliate after 26/11 was one of the most shameful and costly betrayals of India’s post-Independence history. It was not born of moral strength, but of political expediency. Sonia Gandhi and the Congress leadership failed to understand the soul of India. In trying to “protect” Indian Muslims from imaginary threats, they insulted their patriotism and loyalty. And in trying to avoid escalation, they handed victory to the enemy without a fight.

Indian Muslims are not a liability. They are not a vote bank to be pacified. They are proud, equal citizens who mourned with the nation and would have stood with it in war. They didn’t need Congress to shield them. They needed a government that would defend the country—and they were denied that.

History will remember 26/11 not just as a terror attack—but as a test of leadership that Sonia Gandhi’s Congress utterly failed. India deserved better.

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